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Introduction
Computer networks and information and communication technolo-
gies (ICT) constitute the nerve system of modern society.1  States, organi-
zations, corporations, and individuals critically depend on information
infrastructures for— among other things— commerce, communication,
emergency services, energy production and distribution, mass transit, mili-
tary defenses, and health services.  The centrality of ICT in all facets of
modern life— and the vulnerability of these technologies and infrastruc-
tures to threats and damage— necessitates close attention to issues of cyber-
security broadly understood.  As a recent study states:
Cybersecurity incidents, be it [sic] intentional or accidental, are increasing
at an alarming pace and could disrupt the supply of essential services we
take for granted such as water, healthcare, electricity or mobile services.
Threats can have different origins— including criminal, politically motivated,
terrorist or state-sponsored attacks as well as natural disasters and uninten-
† Irving Younger Professor of Law and Director, Institute for International Legal &
Security Studies, University of Minnesota Law School.  I presented the first version of
this Article in June 2013 in “Securing the Freedom and Stability of Cyberspace: The Role
and Relevance of International Law,” an international conference organized by the
International Law Division of the Federal Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of
Germany and the University of Potsdam.  Special thanks to my dear friend, Andreas
Zimmermann, who was one of the co-organizers of the conference and who pushed me
to explore the issues discussed in this Article.  I also thank Stephanna Szotkowski and
Andrew Leiendecker for their excellent research assistance.
1. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE vii
(2003).
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tional mistakes.2
In addition to the growing dependence on ICT, several other trends rein-
force the concern about cybersecurity threats.3  First is the growing depen-
dence on computer networks by critical infrastructure systems (CIS),4
defined in an Executive Order published by President Obama to include
“systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United
States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would
have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security,
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”5  A
second trend concerns the exponential growth in the complexity of com-
2. Commission Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Cybersecurity
Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, at 3, COM (2013) 1
final (Feb. 7, 2013).
3. A November 2013 poll by the PEW Research Center found that seventy percent
of Americans believed “cyber-attacks from other countries” represented a “major threat”
to the United States, putting the fear of cyber incidents on par with domestic terrorist
attacks and nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea. Public Sees U.S. Power Declin-
ing as Support for Global Engagement Slips, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.
people-press.org/2013/12/03/public-sees-u-s-power-declining-as-support-for-global-enga
gement-slips/.
4. 1 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FRAMEWORK FOR
IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY 1 (2014).  The National Institute of
Standards and Technology explained:
The national and economic security of the United States depends on the reliable
functioning of critical infrastructure.  Cybersecurity threats exploit the
increased complexity and connectivity of critical infrastructure systems, placing
the Nation’s security, economy, and public safety and health at risk.  Similar to
financial and reputational risk, cybersecurity risk affects a company’s bottom
line.  It can drive up costs and impact revenue.  It can harm an organization’s
ability to innovate and to gain and maintain customers. Id.
5. Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739, § 2 (Feb. 19, 2013).  A further
Presidential Policy Directive on critical infrastructure security and resilience identified
sixteen critical infrastructure sectors, and specifically pointed to control systems, energy
resources, finance, telecommunications, transportation, and water facilities as critical
infrastructure targets.  Office of the White House Press Secretary, Presidential Policy
Directive 21 (PPD-21): Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (Feb. 12, 2013),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-
critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil. See Peter Sommer & Ian Brown, Reducing Sys-
temic Cybersecurity Risk (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.oecd.org/gov/risk/46889922.pdf
[hereinafter OECD]. See also Eric Luiijf & Marieke Klaver, Governing Critical ICT: Ele-
ments That Require Attention, 6 EUR. J. RISK REG. 263 (2015).  To date, there is no interna-
tionally acceptable definition of what precisely constitutes CIS.  As Kristen Eichensehr
notes:
The Department of Homeland Security lists as examples . . . professional sports
leagues, casinos, campgrounds, and motion picture studios.  Many countries
might be surprised to discover that the United States considers the Iranian hack
of the Las Vegas Sands Corporation and the North Korean hack of Sony Pictures
to be attacks on ‘critical infrastructure.’
Kristen Eichensehr, “International Cyber Stability” and the UN Group of Governmental
Experts, JUST SECURITY (July 14, 2015, 9:21 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/24614/
international-cyber-stability-un-group-governmental-experts/.  Interestingly, Congress
has failed to agree on legislation to enforce minimum standards for equipment running
critical infrastructure. See also Peter G. Neumann, Risks to the Public in Computers and
Related Systems, 33 SOFTWARE ENGINEERING NOTES 15 (2008).
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puter-based systems,6 which makes these systems increasingly vulnerable
to programming errors and bugs, as well as to malicious abuse and
exploitation.7  Complexity is not only limited to individual programs and
software: it is inherent in the structure of ICT networks as a whole.  This
complexity results in system configurations that may simply be unrecog-
nized by those who depend on such systems.  In addition, the low costs of
entry into the world of computer networks and the ability of cyber attack-
ers to disguise themselves make the world of computer networks an
attacker-friendly environment.8  Third, the growing complexity of com-
puter networks, and the data and information that they handle increases
the reliance of such networks on Supervisory Control and Data Acquisi-
tion Systems (SCADA).  Many SCADA devices communicate using Internet
protocols, sometimes over the public Internet, making them susceptible to
attack.9  A fourth trend involves the move to cloud computing that entails
the concentration of data and resources in infrastructures that are main-
tained by third-party providers while, at the same time, physically distrib-
uting those same infrastructures among a number— a potentially large
number— of countries and jurisdictions.10
Legal scholarship about cybersecurity has focused on cyberspace as a
new domain for warfare.  As such, existing discussions have tended to con-
centrate on cyber “crime,” cyber “espionage,” cyber “attacks,” and cyber
“warfare” as willfully perpetrated, pre-meditated, and intentional actions.
Furthermore, existing legal literature has focused almost exclusively on the
legal obligations of, and possible sanctions against, states and non-state
actors that orchestrated cyber attacks, and to a much lesser extent on the
responsibilities of states whose own cyber infrastructure has been used by
6. One example is the growth in Source Lines of Codes (SLOC) in computer pro-
grams.  The OECD study notes that while Windows NT 3.1 had 4.5 million SLOC, Win-
dows XP had 40 million lines of code. OECD, supra note 5, at 22– 23.  More lines of
code mean invariably a greater number of bugs in the software— even if we keep con-
stant the ratio of bugs or lines.
7. Id.
8. See id. at 16– 17.  Cyber operations
can take place in an instant and come from anywhere in the world.  They can be
orchestrated and conducted from the comfort of a home or office, without the
risks of spies and undercover operations, physical break-ins, and the handling of
explosives.  The number of targets that potentially could be reached is stagger-
ing.  Operations could be launched by state or nonstate actors, and by individu-
als or groups.  The cost to the perpetrators might be negligible, the losses to the
victims immeasurable. Id.
DOROTHY E. DENNING, INFORMATION WARFARE AND SECURITY 17 (1998). See also Nicolas
Jupillat, Armed Attacks in Cyberspace: The Unseen Threat to Peace and Security That Rede-
fines the Law of State Responsibility, 92 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 115, 116 (2015) (“Cyber-
space is an equalizing factor that empowers non-State actors to cause heavier damage
than they would in conventional war fighting domains, at considerably lower costs.”).
9. OECD, supra note 5, at 21– 22; Alan T. Murray & Tony H. Grubesic, Fortifying
Large Scale, Geospatial Networks: Implications for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisi-
tion Systems, in 1 CRISIS MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS, METHODOLOGIES, TOOLS, AND APPLICA-
TIONS 224, 239– 40 (2014).
10. See Jorge L. Contreras, Laura DeNardis & Melanie Teplinsky, Mapping Today’s
Cybersecurity Landscape, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1113, 1117 (2013).
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another state or by non-state actors to carry out harmful cyber operations
against a third state.  This Article offers radically different perspectives on
both counts.  First, the Article recognizes that the harm to computer net-
works and physical systems interconnected with them may be just as cata-
strophic when the source of damage is not intentional, but rather, the
result of human error or conventional threats.  Second, the Article offers
the first exploration and analysis of possible bases for, and scope of,
responsibilities and obligations that may be imposed not on the state or
non-state actor that originated the attack, but rather, on the directly
affected state (DAS)— in other words, the state that is the target of the
attack or the cyber incident that endangers their own ICT systems and CIS.
The Article suggests that imposing legal and technological responsibilities
on the state that has been, or indeed may be, exposed to a cyber incident is
warranted both as a matter of conceptualizing state sovereignty, and due to
the state’s various obligations to other states and the global community.
Part I examines briefly the range of possible cyber threats.  Part II analyzes
the possible bases for imposition of responsibility on DAS in the context of
cybersecurity incidents.  Part III more closely examines the nature and
scope of such responsibility before, during, and after a cybersecurity inci-
dent materializes.
I. Cyber Threats
Much has been written in recent years about cyberspace as a new
domain for warfare.11  The magnitude of the threats cannot be underesti-
mated.  Cyber attacks can “bring whole nations to their knees” and “dis-
able companies.”12  While the cost of executing a cyber attack is relatively
small, its financial consequences can be significant.13  The November 2014
11. See, e.g., JEFFREY CARR, INSIDE CYBER WARFARE: MAPPING THE CYBER UNDERWORLD
(2011); PAUL ROSENZWEIG, CYBER WARFARE: HOW CONFLICTS IN CYBERSPACE ARE CHAL-
LENGING AMERICA AND CHANGING THE WORLD (2013); P.W. SINGER & ALLAN FRIEDMAN,
CYBERSECURITY AND CYBERWAR: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 67– 165 (2014); Erik
Gartzke, The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth, 38 INT’L
SECURITY 41 (2013). See also Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations in the Jus in Bello: Key
Issues, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR 89 (Raul Pedrozo &
Daria Wollschlaeger eds., 2011); Harold Hongju Koh, International Law in Cyberspace,
54 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 1 (2012); Michael N. Schmitt, Classification of Cyber Conflict,
17 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 245 (2012); Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus
Ad Bellum Revisited, 56 VILL. L. REV. 569 (2011); Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of Cyber
Warfare: Quo Vadis?, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 269 (2014); Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-
Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421
(2011); United States Cyber Command, Beyond the Build: Delivering Outcomes through
Cyberspace, DEP’T OF DEFENSE (June 3, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/fea
tures/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/docs/US-Cyber-Command-Commanders-Vision.pdf.
12. John E. Dunn, Cyberwar Risks Calamity, Eugene Kaspersky Warns UK Govern-
ment and Spooks, TECHWORLD (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.techworld.com/news/secur
ity/cyberwar-risks-calamity-eugene-kaspersky-warns-uk-government-spooks-3444419/
(quoting Eugene Kaspersky, the founder and CEO of Kaspersky Lab).
13. Defense Secretary Ash Carter, United States Department of Defense, Remarks by
Secretary Carter at the Drell Lecture Cemex Auditorium, Stanford Graduate School of
Business, Stanford, California (Apr. 23, 2015),  http://www.defense.gov/News/News-
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Sony hack resulted, by some accounts, in total costs to the company of
nearly one hundred million dollars.14  PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC)
has put the average total cost of a cyber attack on a broker-dealer firm at
$22 million,15 and the World Economic Forum (WEF) has estimated that
up to $3.06 trillion in projected U.S. economic growth between 2014 and
2020 could be lost if the United States fails to take effective steps to safe-
guard against cyber threats.16  Moreover, cybersecurity incidents “in sec-
tors such as communications, finance, transportation[,] and utilities” can
have catastrophic consequences.17  WEF estimates the risk of a major “crit-
ical information infrastructure breakdown” in the next decade at ten per-
cent.18  Until a decade or two ago, cybersecurity incidents could have been
regarded as mere “black swan” events that mostly occurred unexpect-
edly.19  Their occurrence, however— at some point in time and in some
format— is now all too predictable.20  The number of cybersecurity inci-
dents reported by federal agencies to the U.S. Computer Emergency Readi-
ness Team has increased by 782% from 2006 to 2012— from 5,503 in 2006,
to 48,562 in 2012.21  Similarly, a 2014 PWC survey of “more than 9,700
security, IT, and business executives”22 investigating cybersecurity trends
Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/607043 [hereinafter Carter] (noting that “[l]ow-
cost and global proliferation of malware have lowered barriers to entry and made it
easier for smaller malicious actors to strike in cyberspace”).
14. Lisa Richwine, Cyber Attack Could Cost Sony Studio as Much as $100 Million,
REUTERS (Dec. 9, 2014, 5:58 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/09/us-sony-
cybersecurity-costs-idUSKBN0JN2L020141209.  Sony has not confirmed final costs
from the 2014 hack.  While Sony initially expected costs of the hack to be only $15
million, in April 2015 that estimate was revised up to $41 million.  There have since
been no updates to the estimated cost.  Mike Snider, Sony Forecasts Profit for Next Year,
USA TODAY (Apr. 30, 2015, 11:51 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/04/
30/sony-hack-expenses-41-million/26625671/.
15. Peter Feltman, Cyberattacks Inevitable, SIFMA Told, CQ ROLL CALL, 2015 WL
575039 (Feb. 12, 2015).
16. WORLD ECON. FORUM, RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY IN A HYPERCONNECTED WORLD 25
(2014), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_IT_PathwaysToGlobalCyberResilience_Re
port_2012.pdf [hereinafter RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY].  It is estimated that cyberattacks
that expose or compromise trade secrets produced a global loss ranging “from $749
billion to as high as $2.2 trillion annually,” while the annual cost of cybercrime to the
global economy ranged from $375 billion to as much as $575 billion. MANAGING CYBER
RISK IN AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD, PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS 10– 11, 16 (2014), http:/
/www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/erisaadvisorycouncil2015security3.pdf [hereinafter PWC].
17. Dunn, supra note 12 (quoting Eugene Kaspersky, Kaspersky Lab founder and
CEO, in a speech to UK police, politicians, and CSOs).
18. WORLD ECON. FORUM, GLOBAL RISKS 2015 10TH EDITION 45 (2015), http://www3.
weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Risks_2015_Report15.pdf.  “Critical information infra-
structure breakdown” refers to “[s]ystemic failures of critical information infrastructure”
such as Internet and satellites that “negatively impact industrial production, public ser-
vices[,] and communications.” Id. at 54.
19. See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROB-
ABLE xxi– xxii (2007) (explaining the theory of black swan).
20. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-187, CYBERSECURITY NATIONAL
STRATEGY, ROLES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES NEED TO BE BETTER DEFINED AND MORE EFFECTIVELY
IMPLEMENTED (2013) (showing the number of incidents from 2006– 2012).
21. Id.
22. PWC, supra note 16, at 7.
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and expectations in the business community found that the number of
“security incidents” detected by the business community increased forty-
eight percent from 2013 to 2014, up to a total of 42.8 million incidents:
“the equivalent of 117,339 incoming attacks per day.”23  The number of
institutions reporting cyber attacks costing more than $20 million
increased ninety-two percent in the same period.24  Additionally, there was
an eighty-six percent increase “[in] respondents who say they have been
compromised by nation-states.”25
Whether warnings of a cyber Pearl Harbor are warranted26 or are
overly alarmist,27 there is no questioning the growing awareness of the
need to prepare to face such challenges.  Not surprisingly, an increasing
number of governments have directed their attention to these emerging
risks.28
In the United States, the Obama administration has sought to devise
policies to prepare for both “cyber 9/11” attacks, as well as lower-grade
cyber attacks.  Echoing Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s
view that “a cyber attack perpetrated by nation states or violent extremists
groups could be as a destructive as the terrorist attack on 9/11,”29 the
2015 Director of National Intelligence’s Worldwide Threat Assessment
identified cyber threats as the most significant global threat30 facing the
23. Id. at 7.
24. Id. at 10.
25. Id. at 16.
26. Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, Panetta Warns of Dire Threat of Cyberattack
on U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/world/panet
ta-warns-of-dire-threat-of-cyberattack.html?_r=0; Yasmin Tadjdeh, NSA Chief: China, Rus-
sia Capable of Carrying Out ‘Cyber Pearl Harbor’ Attack, NAT’L DEFENSE (Feb. 23, 2015),
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?List=7c996cd7-cb
b4-4018-baf8-8825eada7aa2&ID=1757 (quoting Admiral Mike Rogers, the Director of
the National Security Agency and Commander of Cyber Command).
27. See, e.g., John Arquilla, Panetta’s Wrong About a Cyber “Pearl Harbor”, FOR. POL’Y
(Nov. 20, 2012), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/20/panettas-wrong-about-a-cyber-
pearl-harbor/.  A 2011 OECD study suggests that, “despite a multiplicity of potential
triggering events . . . there are very few single cyber-events with the capacity to provoke a
global shock.”  OECD, supra note 5, at 10. See also Henry Farrell, The Hack on the U.S.
Government Was Not a ‘Cyber Pearl Harbor’ (But it Was a Very Big Deal), MONKEY CAGE
BLOG (June 15, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/
06/15/the-hack-on-the-u-s-government-was-not-a-cyber-pearl-harbor-but-it-was-a-very-big
-deal/.
28. National Cyber Security Strategies in the World, EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR NETWORK
AND INFO. SECURITY (2013), http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/
national-cyber-security-strategies-ncsss/national-cyber-security-strategies-in-the-world.
See also Scott Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of Care?: Explor-
ing the Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework on Shaping Reasonable
National and International Cybersecurity Practices, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 305, 340– 41 (2015)
(suggesting that states are currently “in the midst of reshaping their own cybersecurity
policies”).
29. Shaun Roberts, Cyber Wars: Applying Conventional Laws of War to Cyber Warfare
and Non-State Actors, 41 N. KY. L. REV. 535, 536 (2014) (quoting Leon Panetta).
30. James Clapper, U.S. Director of National Intelligence, also views cyber attacks as
the most significant threat facing the United States since 2013, when he stated that
“cyber attacks and cyber espionage ha[s] supplanted terrorism as the top security threat
facing the country.”  Jupillat, supra note 8, at 115.
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international community at this time,31 ranking ahead of counterintel-
ligence, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and nuclear prolifera-
tion.32  While the Department of Defense focuses on thwarting and
responding to the most serious cyber attacks— those that would have “sig-
nificant consequences”33 such as “loss of life, significant damage to prop-
erty, serious adverse U.S. foreign policy consequences, or serious
economic impact on the United States”34— other agencies and officials real-
ize the need to address “the near-constant, lower-grade attacks that are car-
ried out routinely.”35  In February 2015, the administration announced the
creation of the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC), to
“analyze and integrate information about cyber threats within the federal
government.”36  The CTIIC will not act as an independent investigative
force, but will instead analyze data already gathered by various federal
agencies.  In this way, the CTIIC is intended to operate similarly to the
National Counterterrorism Center, providing “a central agency to analyze
cyberthreats and coordinate strategy” amongst the preexisting cyber-opera-
tions centers in various federal agencies— including Homeland Security,
the FBI, and the NSA.37  Around the same time, a bill was introduced in the
U.S. Senate entitled “The Cyber Threat Sharing Act of 2015.”  The bill
sought to allocate $14 billion in fiscal year 2016 to protect federal and
private networks from hacking threats,38 and to “give companies legal lia-
bility protections when sharing cyber threat data with [the Department of
Homeland Security’s National Cybersecurity and Communications Integra-
31. Kristen Eichensehr, Cybersecurity in the Intelligence Community’s 2015 Worldwide
Threat Assessment, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 6, 2015, 12:06 PM), https://www.justsecurity.
org/20773/cybersecurity-u-s-intelligence-communitys-2015-worldwide-threat-assessme
nt/.
32. James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record:
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Senate Armed Ser-
vices Committee (2015), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Unclassified_2015_ATA
_SFR_-_SASC_FINAL.pdf.
33. Army Sgt. 1st Class Tyrone C. Marshall Jr., New DoD Cyber Strategy Nears
Release, Official Says, DOD NEWS (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-
View/Article/604456 (quoting Assistant Secretary of Defense Eric Rosenbach’s testi-
mony before the Senate Armed Services Committee’s emerging threats and capabilities
subcommittee as saying the “most serious” cyberattacks constitute no more than two
percent of all cyberattacks).
34. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE DOD CYBER STRATEGY 5 (2015), http://www.defen
se.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRAT
EGY_for_web.pdf [hereinafter DOD CYBER STRATEGY].
35. Elias Groll, U.S. Spy Chief: Get Ready for Everything to be Hacked All the Time,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 10, 2015, 3:25 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/10/u-s-spy-
chief-get-ready-for-everything-to-be-hacked-all-the-time/.
36. Eric Naing, White House to Create New Cyber Threat Agency, CQ ROLL CALL, 2015
WL 544274 (Feb. 11, 2015).
37. Ellen Nakashima, New Agency to Sniff Out Threats in Cyberspace, WASH. POST
(Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/white-
house-to-create-national-center-to-counter-cyberspace-intrusions/2015/02/09/a312201e
-afd0-11e4-827f-93f454140e2b_story.html.
38. Pamela Parker, Bill Would Increase Sharing of Cyber Threat Data, WESTLAW
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DAILY BRIEFING, 2015 WL 586515 (Feb. 13, 2015).
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tion Center].”39  The effect of this legislation would be to improve domestic
cybersecurity safeguards and encourage greater information sharing
between private and governmental institutions.40  After the bill’s introduc-
tion it was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Govern-
ment Affairs, where it remains a pending issue at the time of this writing.41
On April 1, 2015, President Obama issued Executive Order (EO)
13694.  The President found that “the increasing prevalence and severity of
malicious cyber-enabled activities . . . constitute an unusual and extraordi-
nary threat to . . . national security,” leading him to declare that the threat
of cyber warfare was a national emergency.42  EO 13694 identifies the fol-
lowing as perpetrators of cyber attacks:
[A]ny person . . . responsible for or complicit in . . . cyber-enabled activities
originating from, or directed by persons located, in whole or in substantial
part, outside the United States that are reasonably likely to result in, or have
materially contributed to, a significant threat to the national security, for-
eign policy, or economy health or financial stability of the United States.43
Once an individual or group has been identified as the perpetrator of a
cyber attack, the EO “enables the U.S. government to block the property
and assets of those involved in such attacks,44 who have otherwise been
difficult to reach.”45  The practical effectiveness of EO 13694 in deterring
cyber attacks or holding perpetrators accountable still remains to be
seen.46
Despite all the attention given to cyber crime, cyber espionage, cyber
attacks, and cyber warfare, these terms do not enjoy widely accepted defi-
nitions.47  Generally speaking, there are two major approaches to relating
39. Cory Bennett, Senate Dem Introduces White House Cyber Bill, THE HILL (Feb. 11,
2015), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/232534-senate-dem-introduces-white-
house-cyber-bill.
40. Many firms are “afraid to share vital cyber intelligence [with the government]
due to potential lawsuits or federal enforcement actions.”  Naing, supra note 36 (quoting
Cal. Rep. Adam B. Schiff).
41. See S. 456, 114th Cong. (2015– 2016).
42. Exec. Order No. 13,694, 80 Fed. Reg. 18,077 (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.trea
sury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cyber_eo.pdf.
43. Id.
44. “Such attacks” include (i) “Harming, or otherwise significantly compromising
the provision of services by, a computer or network of computers that support one or
more entities in a critical infrastructure sector,” (ii) “significantly compromising the pro-
vision of services by one or more entities in a critical infrastructure sector,” (iii) “causing
a significant disruption to the availability of a computer or network of computers,” (iv)
“causing a significant misappropriation of funds or economic resources, trade secrets,
personal identifiers, or financial information for commercial or competitive advantage
or private financial gain,” or (v) engaging in a conspiracy to commit any of the afore-
mentioned offenses. Id.
45. Allan Abravanel et al., President Issues Executive Order to Block Assets of Foreign
Cyber Attackers, 20 CYBERSPACE L. 3 (May 2015).
46. Kristen Eichensehr, The Cyber Sanctions Executive Order: What Will It Do and
Will It Work?, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 2, 2015, 1:24 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/
21744/cyber-sanctions-executive-order-work/.
47. See, e.g., THOMAS WINGFIELD, THE LAW OF INFORMATION CONFLICT, NATION SECUR-
ITY LAW IN CYBERSPACE 1– 2, 13 (2000) (noting that efforts to classify them are still in
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to cyber events of the categories noted above: the instrument-based
approach or the object-based approach.48  The instrument-based approach
focuses on the mode of assault.49  The use of computers or related net-
works to cause damage may amount to cyber crime, cyber attacks, or cyber
warfare (provided that certain thresholds are crossed which are not the
focus of this paper) regardless of whether the harm caused is done to com-
puters or computer networks.50  The term “cyber” in “cyber attack” refers
to and describes, therefore, the mode of assault and distinguishes it from
traditional kinetic attacks.  In contradistinction, the object-based approach
focuses not on the instrumentalities of attack but on computers or com-
puter networks as the targets of attack conducted through and by any
means, digital or kinetic.51  In this context, “cyber” refers to the object
under attack rather than to the mode of attack.52  The absence of consen-
sus around accepted definitions of “cyber” crime, espionage, attacks, and
warfare is further exacerbated by a lack of consensus as to whether norms
of international law and the U.N. Charter apply to cyberspace,53 and spe-
their infancy); WILLIAM YURCIK & DAVID DOSS, INTERNET ATTACKS: A POLICY FRAMEWORK
FOR RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 2 (2001) (discussing the development of “information war-
fare” with a focus on U.S. vulnerabilities); Susan W. Brenner, “At Light Speed”: Attribu-
tion and Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379,
381 (2007) (defining cyber threats as “using computer technology to engage in activity
that undermines a society’s ability to maintain internal or external order” and defining
cyber crime, cyber terrorism, and cyber warfare separately); Roderic Broadhurst, Devel-
opments in the Global Law Enforcement of Cyber-Crime, 29 POLICING: AN INT’L J. OF POLICE
STRATEGIES & MGMT. 408, 413– 14 (2006) (defining the broader idea of “computer
crime”); Michael Gervais, Cyber Attacks and the Laws of War, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 525,
533 (2012) (referencing the U.S. Army’s D.C.S.I.N.T. Handbook No. 1.02 definition of
“cyber attack”); Joanna Kulesza, State Responsibility for Cyber-Attacks on International
Peace and Security, 29 POLISH Y.B. INT’L L. 139, 140 (2009) (defining “Information War-
fare”); Scott J. Shackelford, State Responsibility for Cyber Attacks: Competing Standards for
a Growing Problem, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 971, 978 (2011) (‘“[C]yberwarfare’ generally
refers to an attack by one hostile nation against the computers or networks of another to
cause disruption or damage (as compared to a criminal or terrorist attack involving
private parties).”).
48. Reese Nguyen, Note, Navigating Jus Ad Bellum in the Age of Cyber Warfare, 101
CALIF. L. REV. 1079, 1085 (2013).
49. Id. at 1088.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1086– 87.
52. Id. at 1087– 88.  To be sure, the increasing incorporation of networked comput-
ing technology into physical infrastructure, systems, and products means that the target
of an attack on a computer network may well be the physical components with which
that network is tightly connected rather than the network itself. Id.
53. U.N. Secretary-General, Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the
Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, ¶ 19,
U.N. Doc. A/68/98 (June 24, 2013) [hereinafter GEE], http://www.un.org/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=A/68/98 (“International law, and in particular the Charter of the
United Nations, is applicable and is essential to maintaining peace and stability and
promoting an open, secure, peaceful and accessible ICT environment.”).  A new consen-
sus document, however, prepared in 2015 by the Group of Governmental Experts
“[e]xcluded . . . another U.S. proposal: One that sought to spell out the implications of a
2013 experts’ group agreement that international law generally applies in cyberspace
just as it does on land or at sea.” See Joseph Marks, U.N. Body Agrees to U.S. Norms in
Cyberspace, POLITICO (July 9, 2015, 12:44 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/
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cifically, whether and how the norms pertaining to self-defense under arti-
cle 51 of the Charter apply to cyber attacks and operations, and the
responses thereto.54
Both the instrument-based approach and the object-based approach
share a common conception of willfully perpetrated cyber crime, cyber
attacks, and cyber warfare.  Whether criminally or politically motivated,
terrorist and state-sponsored attacks are pre-meditated and intentional.
Unauthorized access to computer systems or networks, theft of information
contained in electronic forms, mail bombing, data diddling, salami attacks,
computer viruses and malwares, logic bombs, Trojan horses, Internet time
thefts, Web jacking, and key-logging are all deliberate logical attacks.55
Such attacks may focus on the syntax of the target system, disrupting its
operating system; or they may be semantic, compromising the accuracy of
the information processed by the system.56  They may penetrate the sys-
tem— such as through viruses, worms, and Trojans— or disrupt the system
07/un-body-agrees-to-us-norms-in-cyberspace-119900.  The drafters of the Tallinn Man-
ual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare adopted the position that
general principles of international law applied to cyberspace. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 13 (Michael N. Schmitt ed. 2013)
[hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL].
54. David E. Sanger, U.S. and China Seek Arms Deal for Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/20/world/asia/us-and-china-seek-arms-
deal-for-cyberspace.html.  The agreement concluded between the two countries did not,
eventually, include a provision pertaining to attacks on CIS. See The White House, Fact
Sheet: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States (Sept. 25, 2015), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-jinpings-state-
visit-united-states. See also Kristen E. Eichensehr, Cyberwar & International Law Step
Zero, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 357, 365– 67 (2015).
55. See Kamini Dashora, Cyber Crime in the Society: Problems and Preventions, 3 J.
ALTERNATIVE PERSP. SOC. SCI. 240, 245– 52 (2011) (defining each of the different types of
cyber attacks as well as classifying them by attacks against individuals, against individ-
ual property, against organizations, and against society at large).  For a summary of
cyber security incidents recorded from the US-CERT Control Systems Center (CSSC),
see generally ROBERT J. TURK, CYBER INCIDENTS INVOLVING CONTROL SYSTEMS (2005); Vida
M. Antolin-Jenkins, Defining the Parameters of Cyberwar Operations: Looking for Law in
All the Wrong Places, 51 NAVAL L. REV. 132, 138– 141 (2005); Arie J. Schaap, Cyber War-
fare Operations: Development and Use Under International Law, 64 A.F.L. REV. 121,
134– 38 (2009); Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberat-
tacks: A Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to
Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 13– 21 (2009) (discussing the effects of different types of
cyber-attacks); Benjamin S. Buckland et al., Democratic Governance Challenges of Cyber
Security 15 (D.C.A.F. Horizon 2015 Working Paper No. 1, 2010), http://www.dcaf.ch/
Publications/Democratic-Governance-Challenges-of-Cyber-Security (providing a table of
categories of cyber threats).
56. The most common syntactic attack is the (Distributed) Denial-of-Service, flood-
ing a system with bogus requests for service.  Nguyen, supra note 48, at 1097.  It should R
be noted that DoS or DDoS attacks disrupt the system by diminishing the system’s func-
tionality, but the attacks typically do not leave a permanent mark on the system inas-
much as they do not modify or destroy the computer system’s resources. Id. See also
Eric Naing & Ryan Lucas, DNI: Cyber threat shifting to data manipulation, CQ ROLL
CALL, 2015 WL 5256370 (Sep. 10, 2015) (arguing that the focus of cyber attacks will
shift from theft and destruction towards “operations that will change or manipulate elec-
tronic information to compromise its integrity . . . its accuracy and its reliability instead
of merely deleting it or disrupting access to it”).
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by diminishing its functionality without penetrating the system or modify-
ing the attacked system’s resources, such as in the case of denial of service
attacks.57  In addition, attacks may be kinetically performed against the
physical infrastructure underlying ICT through, for example, bombing a
server’s farm.58
Yet, the harm to both computer networks and physical systems inter-
connected with such networks may be just as catastrophic when the source
of damage is not intentional, but rather, the result of human error or con-
ventional threats.59  There is ample empirical data demonstrating the cen-
tral role human error plays in cybersecurity incidents.60  A report by IBM
indicates that human error has been a contributing factor in over ninety-
five percent of all investigated cyber incidents.61  Similarly, natural disas-
ters may result in the weakening and overburdening of critical information
systems due to higher than normal demand levels,62 and the lowering of
security protocols in order to allow out-of-venue responders to use existing
systems for disaster management operations.63  Such weakening of critical
systems may have cascading effects when criminals, terrorists, or other
nations seek to engage in cyber attacks against the weakened systems.
Conventional disasters may also be followed by secondary— or even terti-
ary— events that would degrade critical systems even further, compounding
once again the potential for a large-magnitude harm.
II. Imposing Legal Responsibility on Directly Affected States
Considering cybersecurity incidents through the prism of natural
disasters (rather than through the traditional focus on intentional harms)
assists in explaining and justifying the imposition of responsibilities on a
57. See, e.g., Stefan Kirchner, Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks: Under Public
International Law: State Responsibility in Cyberwar, 8 IUP J. CYBER L. 10, 10– 11 (2009).
58. See DEPT. OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS 5 (2009).
59. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-1036, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PRO-
TECTION: MULTIPLE EFFORTS TO SECURE CONTROL SYSTEMS ARE UNDER WAY, BUT CHAL-
LENGES REMAIN, 2, 12, 13 (2007).
60. See, e.g., Ghi Paul Im & Richard L. Baskerville, A Longitudinal Study of Informa-
tion System Threat Categories: The Enduring Problem of Human Error, 36 DATA BASE FOR
ADVANCES IN INFO. SYSTEMS 68, 68– 79 (2005).
61. IBM GLOBAL TECH. SERV., IBM SECURITY SERVICES 2014 CYBER SECURITY INTELLI-
GENCE INDEX 3 (2014), http://media.scmagazine.com/documents/82/ibm_cyber_secur
ity_intelligenc_20450.pdf.  The most common errors included: opening an infected
attachment or unsafe URL, system misconfiguration, poor patch management, use of
default usernames and passwords, lost laptops or mobile devices, and disclosure of
information through use of an incorrect email address. Id. See also Im, supra note 60, at R
75 (“[T]he major source of unmanaged risks to information systems continues to be
accidental in nature.  Most of these accidents result arise at the knowledge base error
level.”).
62. An example is the overloading of information infrastructures in the aftermath of
a disaster.  Such overloading may result in the system crashing, preventing flow of criti-
cal information in real time that may interfere with timely identification and assessment
of the harm as well as inhibit recovery efforts.  Im, supra note 60, at 69.
63. Id.
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state that has been exposed to a cyber incident.64  Such justifications are
both inward- and outward-looking.  On the one hand, a state owes certain
duties to its own nationals as well as to those who find themselves in its
territory.  Such duties are inherent in human rights law and in interna-
tional humanitarian law,65 as well as in the very notion of sovereignty.
Conceptions of sovereignty as a contingent value depend on the actions of
the state that invokes its subordinate state sovereignty to human rights
claims.  Justifications for sovereignty no longer rest exclusively on sover-
eignty’s own presumptive legitimacy, but rather expand to incorporate jus-
tifications that derive from the individuals whose rights are to be protected,
and from their right to a safe framework in which they can enforce their
autonomy and pursue their interests.66  As former U.N. Secretary-General
Kofi Annan put it: “[t]he state is now widely understood to be the servant
of its people, and not vice versa.”67  In its report to the Secretary-General,
entitled A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, the United Nations
Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
pursued a similarly holistic view of security, looking both at state security
and human security.  The Panel adopted a broad conception of the latter to
incorporate both negative freedoms (freedom from fear and absence of vio-
lent conflict) and positive freedoms (such as freedom from want) in order
to subject state security to human security.68
To do that, the Panel redefined state sovereignty as a responsibility-
based rather than a rights-based concept: “In signing the Charter of the
United Nations, States not only benefit from the privileges of sovereignty
but also accept its responsibilities,” which include both external obliga-
64. DAS responsibilities, measured against a background of cybersecurity incidents
that are the result of natural disasters, raise less resistance as seeking to blame the vic-
tim.  It is because of that broader conception of cybersecurity incidents that is suggested
in this Article, for example, as comprising both intentional and non-intentional threats
and harms, that I prefer to use the term “Directly Affected State” to describe states who
suffer the harmful consequences of cybersecurity incidents, rather than the terms “vic-
tim state” or “target state” that may suggest a certain degree of intentionality behind the
threat.
65. States have an Article 58 duty to protect civilian populations “to the maximum
extent feasible.”  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art.
58, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.  Article 58 also requires that the government take
“other necessary precautions.”  Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Warfare and Precautions against
the Effects of Attacks Symposium, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1533, 1552 n.123 (2010).  “Precautions”
refers to actions taken in advance, not in response to attacks.  In the context of cyber
attacks, a state cannot take this obligation as a reactionary responsibility. Id. at 1554.
66. For recent scholarly work regarding responsibility to protect, see generally
Monica Hakimi, Toward a Legal Theory on the Responsibility to Protect, 39 YALE J. INT’L L.
247 (2014); Thomas H. Lee, The Law of War and the Responsibility to Protect Civilians: A
Reinterpretation, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. 251 (2014); Saira Mohamed, Taking Stock of the
Responsibility to Protect, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 319 (2012).
67. Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Presents His Annual
Report to General Assembly, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/7136 (Sept. 20, 1999).
68. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Respon-
sibility: Rep. of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, U.N. Doc. A/
59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
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tions to other states and the international community as a whole, and
internal obligations to protect the welfare of their own peoples.69  States
are to be protected not because they are, as such, intrinsically good, but
because they are “[n]ecessary to achieve the dignity, justice, worth and
safety of their citizens.”70  The interconnectedness between computer net-
works and the physical world means that cybersecurity incidents are
increasingly more likely to threaten individuals’ enjoyment of some of their
basic rights, and even endanger their health and lives.71  Computers and
computer networks are now embedded in every facet of modern life, from
cellphones, cars, and traffic lights, to hospitals, dams, airport control, and
electricity grids.  Failure of a state to give appropriate protection to its com-
puter networks or to remedy and correct damage to such systems expedi-
tiously, adequately, and in a timely manner may impair the ability of
citizens to enjoy such fundamental rights as the rights to health, privacy,
movement, and association— and indeed the very right to life.
A state’s obligations, however, are not merely to its own nationals and
to people in its territory.  In a digitally interconnected world, the strength
of the digital chain may be only as strong as its weakest link.72  Cyber-
security incidents that compromise the security or the functionality of a
network component in one country may have critical spillover impacts on
the security or functionality of other parts of the network, or other net-
works that are connected or otherwise related to it, and that may directly or
indirectly affect other states or non-state actors.73  Attacks on servers in
the territory of Country X may result in significant harm to the networks
and interests of Country Y— and indeed Countries A, B, and C— as well as
to individuals who have otherwise no relationship to Country X.  Virus or
malware attacks directed at a particular country’s computers may not be
limited to that country, either because the malware has not been program-
med carefully or because of other factors that may cause the malware to
spill over to computers in other countries.74
69. Id. at 17.
70. Id.
71. “There are significant and growing risks of localised misery and loss as a result
of compromise of computer and telecommunications services.”  OECD, supra note 5, at
6.
72. Stephen E. Henderson & Matthew E. Yarbrough, Suing the Insecure?: A Duty of
Care in Cyberspace, 32 N.M. L. REV. 11, 11 (2002).
73. OECD, supra note 5, at 85.
74. Id.  Thus, for example, Stuxnet, a computer worm considered to be the world’s
first digital weapon that attacked Iranian centrifuges and computer system involved in
Iran’s nuclear program, also infected computer systems outside of Iran.  Historic data
from the early days of the Stuxnet worm attack shows Iran, Indonesia, and India
accounting for 58.85%, 18.22%, and 8.31% respectively of infected machines globally.
W32.Stuxnet, SYMANTEC (Feb. 26, 2013) http://www.symantec.com/security_response/
writeup.jsp?docid=2010-071400-3123-99. See also KIM ZETTER, COUNTDOWN TO ZERO
DAY: STUXNET AND THE LAUNCH OF THE WORLD’S FIRST DIGITAL WEAPON 29– 31 (2014)
(noting that over 300,000 machines were infected by the worm with the majority of
those located in Iran, but about forty percent located in other countries such as Indone-
sia and India).
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It is well established that a state may not use, nor permit the use of, its
territory in such a manner as to cause injury in or to the territory of
another or the properties or persons therein.75  A state may not “allow
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
States.”76  Similarly, the International Group of Experts (IGE) that drafted
the Tallinn Manual on the International Law of Cyber Warfare, concluded
that a “State shall not knowingly allow the cyber infrastructure located in
its territory or under its exclusive governmental control to be used for acts
that adversely and unlawfully affect other States.”77  According to the IGE,
this due diligence obligation is imposed on states both with respect to gov-
ernment and private cyber infrastructure on their territory as well as cyber
activities emanating from that territory.78  Furthermore, states may have a
duty to prevent illegal attacks that they knew about beforehand.79  The
European Convention on Cybercrime criminalizes cyber attacks and also
confirms the duty of states to prevent territories from being used by non-
state actors to conduct these cyber attacks.80  The U.N. General Assembly
has also called for the criminalization of cyber attacks,81 prevention of
allowing safe havens to launch cyber attacks,82 and cooperation in the
investigation and prosecution of international cyber attacks.83  The Gen-
eral Assembly and some states have also labeled cyber attacks as a threat to
75. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1941)
(noting that a state “owes at all times a duty to protect other states against injurious acts
by individuals from within their jurisdiction”).  See also Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v.
U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 839 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928) (noting the duty of every state “to pro-
tect within the territory the rights of other states, in particular their right to integrity and
inviolability in peace and in war”).
76. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, ¶ 22 (Apr. 9).
See also Rorbert P. Barnidge, Jr., The Due Diligence Principle under International Law, 8
INT’L COMM. L. REV. 81 (2006); Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, The Due Diligence Rule and
the Nature of the International Responsibility of States, 35 GERM. Y.B. INT’L L. 9 (1992).
77. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 53, at 26 (Rule 5).
78. See id. See also Michael N. Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace,
125 YALE L.J. FORUM 68, 70 (2015).  Rather than recognize due diligence as a legal obli-
gation that is imposed on states in cyberspace, however, the GGE report merely stated
that “States should seek to ensure that their territories are not used by non-state actors
for unlawful use of ICTs.”  GGE, supra note 53, at 23.
79. This duty includes state obligations to enact stringent criminal laws against the
commission of international cyber attacks from within national boundaries; to conduct
meaningful, detailed investigations into cyber attacks; to prosecute those who have
engaged in these attacks; and to cooperate with the victim states’ own investigations and
prosecutions of those responsible for the attacks.  Sklerov, supra note 55, at 62– 72. But R
see Schmitt, supra note 78, at 70– 71 (noting that the IGE did not come to an agreement
as to whether the due diligence obligation “applies when a state knows that such [harm-
ful cyber] activities will be launched but they have not yet materialized”).
80. Convention on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, Nov. 23, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 282,
2296 U.N.T.S. 167.  While primarily a treaty among members of the Council of Europe,
this convention has also been ratified by the United States, Australia, Canada, and
Japan, along with several other non-Council of Europe nations.
81. G.A. Res. 45/121, ¶ 3 (Dec. 14, 1990) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 45/121].
82. G.A. Res. 55/63, ¶ 1 (Jan. 22, 2001).
83. Id.
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international peace and security.84  Similarly, the 2015 report of the U.N.
Group of Governmental Experts adopts the U.S.-supported “rules of the
road” in cyberspace,85 which include, among others, the acknowledgment
that “[a] State should not conduct or knowingly support ICT activity con-
trary to its obligations under international law that intentionally damages
critical infrastructure or otherwise impairs the use and operation of critical
infrastructure to provide services to the public.”86  While the duty to pre-
vent applies to the state whose territory has been used to launch a cyber
attack, it may be extended, conceptually, to DAS who— by the very weak-
ness and vulnerability of their ICT systems— endanger not only themselves
and their nationals but also other states and non-state actors.87  Notions of
“good neighborliness” and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas may be simi-
larly useful in this context.88  Going a step further, it may also be appropri-
ate to conceptualize the Internet and ICT networks and systems as matters
of a common concern of mankind, much like biodiversity and the world’s
climate.89
States that are directly affected by cybersecurity incidents, therefore,
ought to bear some of the burden of meeting the threats and challenges
related to such incidents.  Their responsibility— which does not in any way
reduce the responsibility of the states or non-state actors who have initiated
the threat— has several layers to it.  Successfully coping with cybersecurity
harms requires all states to invest funds, technology, intelligence, and
human resources to reduce their vulnerabilities to cybersecurity incidents;
invest in and improve their capacities to identify, assess, prioritize, and
disrupt threats at as early a stage as possible; and act comprehensively and
effectively in coordinating and executing both their short-term responses
84. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE NAT’L STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE 49– 52
(2003), http://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cyberspace_strategy.
pdf; G.A. Res. 45/121, supra note 81.
85. Joseph Marks, U.S. Makes New Push for Global Rules in Cyberspace, POLITICO
(May 5, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/us-makes-new-push-for-global-
rules-in-cyberspace-117632.
86. U.N. Secretary-General, Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the
Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, ¶
13(f), U.N. Doc. A/70/174 (July 22, 2015), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp
?symbol=A/70/174.
87. But see Schmitt, supra note 78, at 71 (noting that the IGE did not agree “on
whether a state must take preventive measures to ensure the cyber hygiene of the infra-
structure on its territory or whether states should be required to monitor for malicious
activity that might be directed at other states”).  Schmitt also notes that the IGE failed to
reach consensus on whether the obligation of due diligence is imposed on transit states.
Id. at 72– 73.  Those who would not extend the obligation to transit states are even less
likely to see it applied to and imposed on states that are the targets of harmful cyber
activities.
88. U.N. Charter art. 74; United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Stockholm Declaration, princ. 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 5-16, 1972).
See Elmer E. Smead, Sic Utere Tuo Ut Alienum Non Laedas A Basis of the State Police
Power, 21 CORNELL L. REV. 276, 276 (1936).
89. See, e.g., U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), annex I (Aug.
12, 1992).
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and recovery efforts once threats materialize, as well as long-term adjust-
ments and rehabilitation.  In order to minimize the harmful consequences
of cybersecurity incidents— in particular when CIS are concerned— DAS
will have to invest purposefully in and improve not only their own capabili-
ties but also ensure open, uninterrupted channels of communication with
other states and potentially with non-state actors who may be able to assist
in mitigation of the harms caused.90
Increasing the free flow of information between private institutions
and the government, both by encouraging private institutions to disclose
incidents to the government (as addressed, for example, by EO 13694) and
sharing government information with the relevant non-state actors is key to
improving the detection, identification, and eventual punishment of poten-
tial cyber attackers.  Lisa Monaco, the Homeland Security Advisor to Presi-
dent Obama, recognizes that “[g]etting the private sector to share data
about cyber threats is a key part of bolstering . . . cyber defenses.”91
Exchange of information between state and non-state actors would “crowd-
source solutions to cyber threats by allowing private industry and the gov-
ernment to share malware . . . and create solutions to defend against it.”92
Facilitating and encouraging the free flow of information between the pri-
vate and public sectors— both inter-nationally and intra-nationally— would
allow states to build stronger safeguards against cyber threats, reducing the
likelihood and frequency of cyber incidents.  The United States Secretary
of Defense, Ash Carter, similarly touted the need for close partnership
between the private sector and government.93  Noting that “American busi-
nesses own, operate, and see approximately ninety percent of our national
networks,”94 Secretary Carter emphasized that
the private sector must be a key partner. The U.S. government has a unique
suite of cyber tools and capabilities, but we need the private sector to take its
own steps to protect its data and networks.  We want to help where we can,
but if companies themselves don’t invest, our country’s collective cyber pos-
90. Carter, supra note 13.  Secretary Carter stated:
As a military, we have to embrace openness.  Today dozens of militaries are
developing cyber forces, and because stability depends on avoiding miscalcula-
tion that could lead to escalation, militaries must talk to each other and under-
stand each other’s abilities.  And DoD must do its part to shed more light on
cyber capabilities that have previously been developed in the shadows.
91. Naing, supra note 36 (citing Cal. Rep. Adam B. Schiff). See also Carter, supra
note 13 (“One way we’re responding . . . is by being more transparent, to raise awareness
in both the public and the private sector.  Indeed, shining a bright light on such intru-
sions can eventually benefit us all— businesses and governments alike.”).
92. Ranking Member Adam Schiff, Opening Statement in House Permanent Select




93. Carter, supra note 13 (“ . . . we know that working together in the cyber domain
is essential.  And that’s why one of the primary aspects of our strategy is working with
partners— in the private sector, across our government, and around the world.”).
94. Id.
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ture is weakened and our ability to augment that protection is limited.95
Furthermore, as this Article discusses below, DAS may be under an obliga-
tion not only to communicate with other states— and perhaps even non-
state actors— about cybersecurity incidents, but also to receive external
assistance in meeting those threats and harms.  Finally, it should be noted
that global interconnectivity and interdependence of information and tele-
communication technologies and computer networks mean that, to varying
degrees, each and every country may find itself the direct object of cyber-
security incidents.  Thus, whatever obligations DAS may have are shared
among the nations of the world.
In looking for sources for state legal responsibility in this area it may
also be instructive to note the argument that companies that fall victim to
cybersecurity breaches and cyber attacks bear responsibility for protecting
themselves against such attacks and their harmful consequences.96  Yang
and Hoffstadt argue that the victim-company would be forced to absorb
losses and might incur additional losses if it were sued for failing to secure
its intellectual property and computer systems.97  Such lawsuits may seek
tort relief for breach of the duty of care to maintain a secure network or a
breach of fiduciary duty to keep data secure.98  Recently, the Third Circuit
upheld a suit brought by the Federal Trade Commission against the Wynd-
ham hotel chain in which the FTC argued that Wyndham’s failure to under-
take adequate cybersecurity measures— failure that resulted in hackers
carrying out three cybersecurity attacks against the hotel chain and steal-
ing personal information stored by Wyndham about its guests99— consti-
tuted an “unfair business practice.”  Judge Ambro, writing for the court,
rejected Wyndham’s three arguments against finding of unfairness.  First,
the court held that unfair conduct need not necessarily be unscrupulous or
unethical.100  Second, the court ruled that even if one were to accept
Wyndham’s argument equating “unfair” with “not equitable,” a company
“does not act equitably when it publishes a privacy policy to attract cus-
tomers who are concerned about data privacy, fails to make good on that
promise by investing inadequate resources in cybersecurity, exposes its
unsuspecting customers to substantial financial injury, and retains the
profits of their business.”101  Finally, the court rejected Wyndham’s con-
95. Id.
96. Debra Wong Yang & Brian M. Hoffstadt, Countering the Cyber-Crime Threat, 43
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 201, 207– 08 (2006).
97. See id. at 207. See, e.g., Complaint at 4, Parke v. Cardsystems Sols., Inc., No.
CGC-05-442624 (Cal. Super. Ct., June 27, 2005); Class Action Complaint, Goldberg v.
ChoicePoint, Inc., No. BC329115 (Cal. Super. Ct., Feb. 18, 2005).
98. Yang & Hoffstadt, supra note 96, at 208.  This will, arguably, incentivize compa-
nies to take measures to prevent cyber attacks.  Hardware and software manufacturers
are generally shielded from liability because they condition the use of their product on
the acceptance of a licensing agreement that absolves them of most forms of liability for
design defects that result in future vulnerabilities to users’ computers. Id. at 208– 09.
99. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. et al, 799 F.3d 236, 241– 42
(2015).
100. Id. at 244– 45.
101. Id. at 245.
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tention that a business “does not treat its customers in an ‘unfair’ manner
when the business itself is victimized by criminals.”102  Thus, the court
concluded, Wyndham’s alleged conduct fell within the plain meaning of
unfair and was subject to regulation under Section 45(a) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act of 1914.103
Some scholars have advocated the implementation of a “cybersecurity
negligence” standard, as “a means of determining liability for companies
who suffer damage from lax cybersecurity.”104  Applying this formula to
DAS, however, allows weaker states to implement weaker standards, which
is problematic given the interconnected nature of cyberspace, and the abil-
ity of cyber threats to penetrate networks through weak links in the inter-
connected chain.  Other scholars support a heightened degree of mens rea
before imposing obligations or liability upon an institution for failing to
prevent a cyber attack.  Yet others caution against implementing anything
less than an actual knowledge or willful blindness standard.  While some
may support a “constructive knowledge” standard for holding institutions
accountable, Michael Schmitt argues that
[a]s the means of cyber identification and attribution are typically classi-
fied . . . states will be reticent to reveal their capabilities[, making] it highly
problematic to determine with some certainty whether a particular state’s
technical capabilities are at a level at which the offending cyber operations
should . . . have been identified and attributed.105
The issue of the liability of private corporations and non-state actors for
damage caused to them and others as a result of their failure to undertake
appropriate cybersecurity measures and put in place robust defenses
against harmful cyber incidents, whether man-made or not, is of particular
relevance to this discussion.  On the one hand, non-state actors often find
themselves on the “cyber frontline.”106  Cyber defense does not occur in a
102. Id. at 246.
103. Id. at 247. See also David Fagan, John Grabert, Kurt Wimmer and Caleb Skeath,
5 Things Every GC Should Know about Wyndham, CORP. COUNSEL (Oct. 16, 2015), http://
www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202740035068/5-Things-Every-GC-Should-Know-about-
Wyndham?slreturn=20150919093615 (noting that the court’s ruling “reaffirms the
FTC’s authority to bring unfairness actions on the basis of ‘likely’ substantial injury to
consumers, even if no such injuries have actually occurred . . . the actions of hackers
and other intervening criminal actors may not immunize companies from FTC data
security enforcement actions”); Paul Rosenzweig, The FTC Takes Charge— FTC v. Wynd-
ham, LAWFARE BLOG (Aug. 26, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/ftc-takes-charge-ftc-
v-wyndham (“The FTC now owns cybersecurity in the private sector . . . we’ve converted
a consumer protection mandate into a cybersecurity obligation and assigned that role to
an independent agency.”); Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, FTC v. Wyndham:
The Third Circuit Recognizes FTC Authority to Regulate Commercial Cyber Security Prac-
tices, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/ftc-v-wynd
ham-third-circuit-recognizes-ftc-authority-to-regulate-commercial-cyber (“All web-facing
companies which collect personally identifiable information are on notice that they rou-
tinely must maintain the integrity and security of such consumer data.”).
104. Shackelford et. al., supra note 28, at 313. R
105. Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of Cyber Warfare: Quo Vadis?, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 269, 278 (2014).
106. Carter, supra note 13.  Secretary Carter explained:
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“neutral space” but inside organizational networks.107  It depends on the
organization— its use of technologies, and its will and ability to protect,
cooperate, and collaborate with other organizations and the state— to be
successful.  At the same time, the gamut of non-state actors whose actions
or omissions affect states are not limited to the territory of any one particu-
lar state.
Before turning to examine briefly the possible sources and scope of
DAS responsibility, I should note that while there are significant develop-
ments taking place towards the recognition of the duties discussed in the
remainder of this Article as a matter of positive, existing international law,
many such duties belong to the realm of lex ferenda rather than form obli-
gations de lege lata.
III. Responsibility of DAS Before, During, and After Cybersecurity
Incidents
A. Responsibility of DAS Before Cybersecurity Incidents
States have sovereign authority over infrastructure and activities
within their territory.108  Although no state can claim sovereignty over
cyberspace as such, states may exercise sovereign prerogatives over cyber
infrastructure that is physically located, and activities that take place, in
their territory.109  No state, however, is able or expected, regardless of its
level of technological sophistication and commitment of human resources
and funds, to foolproof its systems against cybersecurity incidents.110  ICT
and their related systems and infrastructures are interconnected globally,
which means that prevention cannot be fully accomplished on a local,
national level.  Inter-state cooperation is needed.  Not only is such coopera-
tion lacking on the state level at present,111 but even if it were attained,
non-state actors could still be able to carry out cyber attacks112 and natu-
While we in DoD are an attractive target, the cyber threat is one we all face . . . as
institutions, and as individuals.  Networks nationwide are scanned millions of
times a day.  And as we’ve seen cyber attackers bombard the public websites of
banks, make off with customer data from retailers, try to access critical infra-
structure networks, and steal research and intellectual property from universi-
ties and businesses alike . . . so too have individual citizens been compelled to
guard against identity theft.
107. I thank Amit Ashkenazi for raising this point when commenting on an earlier
draft of this Article.
108. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 53, at 15– 23. R
109. Id.
110. Zoë Baird, Foreword, in CYBER SECURITY: TURNING NATIONAL SOLUTIONS INTO
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION vii, vii (James A. Lewis ed., 2003).
111. See James A. Lewis, Introduction, in CYBER SECURITY: TURNING NATIONAL SOLU-
TIONS INTO INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION xi, xi– xii (James A. Lewis ed., 2003). See also
Michael Vatis, International Cyber-Security Cooperation, Informal Bilateral Models, in
CYBER SECURITY: TURNING NATIONAL SOLUTIONS INTO INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 1, 1– 4
(James A. Lewis ed., 2003).
112. The U.S. Department of Defense’s Cyber Strategy clearly points out:
In addition to state-based threats, non-state actors like the Islamic State in Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL) use cyberspace to recruit fighters and disseminate propa-
ganda and have declared their intent to acquire disruptive and destructive cyber
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ral disasters would still pose problems of catastrophic proportions.  Fur-
thermore, cybersecurity incidents may happen very quickly, even
automatically, impacting a large number of victims at the same time.113
Attacks can be carried out cheaply114— or cost nothing in the case of a
natural disaster— while establishing robust defenses against cybersecurity
incidents is costly and complex, limiting the capacity and willingness of
many countries around the world to undertake such measures.115
States may be expected to exercise due diligence116 and establish fea-
sible, primarily passive defenses against cybersecurity incidents.117  Pas-
sive defenses include system access controls that prevent unauthorized
users from getting into a system and force authorized users to be security-
conscious,118 data access controls that are aimed at the data and programs
capabilities.  Criminal actors pose a considerable threat in cyberspace, particu-
larly to financial institutions, and ideological groups often use hackers to fur-
ther their political objectives.  State and non-state threats often also blend
together; patriotic entities often act as cyber surrogates for states, and non-state
entities can provide cover for state-based operators.  This behavior can make
attribution more difficult and increases the chance of miscalculation.
DOD CYBER STRATEGY, supra note 34, at 9.
113. Gregory C. Wilshusen & David A. Powner, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO 10-230T, CONTINUED EFFORTS ARE NEEDED TO PROTECT INFORMATION SYSTEMS FROM
EVOLVING THREATS 5 (2009).
114. Stephen E. Henderson & Matthew E. Yarbrough, Suing the Insecure?: A Duty of
Care in Cyberspace, 32 N.M. L. REV. 11, 22 (2002); William J. Lynn, Defending a New
Domain: The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 97, 98 (2010).
115. Most developing countries do not have a telecommunications sector capable of
supporting ICT.  The digital divide is most extreme in Asia, with some countries having
seventy percent of households connected to the Internet (like South Korea, Japan, Hong
Kong, and Singapore) and less than one percent in others (like Laos, Cambodia,
Mongolia, and Myanmar). See, e.g., Roderic Broadhurst, Developments in the Global Law
Enforcement of Cyber-Crime, 29 POLICING: AN INT’L J. OF POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 408,
410– 11 (2006).  The 2013 Report of the United Nations Group of Governmental
Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the
Context of International Security called on member states to engage in capacity building
efforts to assist developing countries to build the required skills to protect their net-
works and citizens.  U.N. Doc. A/68/98, supra note 53.
116. For a recent discussion of the concept of due diligence in the context of “a state’s
legal responsibilities when cyber infrastructure located on its territory is used by
another state— or by non-state actors, such as hacker groups, individual hacktivists,
organized armed groups, or terrorists— to mount the operations,” see Schmitt, supra note
78, at 68.
117. For an overview of proactive mechanisms, reactive mechanisms, and design and
analysis principles, see Alvaro A. Cárdenas et al., Secure Control: Towards Survivable
Cyber-Physical Systems, 28TH INT’L CONF. ON DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING SYS. WORKSOPS
495, 496– 98 (2008). See also Andrea Atzeni & Antonio Lioy, Why to Adopt a Security
Metric? A Brief Survey, in QUALITY OF PROTECTION 6– 9 (2006); Dennis Edwards et al.,
Prevention, Detection and Recovery from Cyber-Attacks Using a Multilevel Agent Architec-
ture, in SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 1 (2007) (providing a technical description of
how intelligent software agents could improve cyber-security); Barbara Endicott-Popov-
sky & Deb Fincke, ADDING THE FOURTH “R”: A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO SOLVING THE
HACKER’S ARMS RACE 8 (2006).
118. Examples of system access controls include a username and password, electronic
keys, tokens, badges, and smart cards, as well as biometric or behavioral pass codes
including fingerprints, handprints, retina patterns, iris patterns, voice, signatures, or
keystroke patterns.  Other systems use transmission encryption, challenge response pro-
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inside the system instead of access controls,119 security administration
(security policies, training, and audits to ensure protection),120 and secur-
ity system design that uses hardware and software to protect the system.121
They may also include mechanisms that would facilitate timely warnings
against cyber threats and security incidents.  It is worth noting that
employment by states or private companies122 of more active self-help mea-
sures— such as “hackbacks”— that are designed to disable, counterattack, or
even destroy the attacker’s own system in response to cyber attacks raises
serious legal challenges both as a matter of domestic law123 and of the
international law of armed conflict.124
States ought also to engage in a robust resilience planning125 that
involves, among other things, building up redundant systems,126 offline
backups, and parallel networks,127 as well as enhancing system interoper-
ability to improve sharing of critical information, and developing of alter-
cedures, and password controls.  2 RICK LEHTINEN ET AL., COMPUTER SECURITY BASICS
49– 62 (2006).
119. Id. at 50.
120. Id. at 96– 98.
121. Examples include anti-virus, encryption, firewalls, and intrusion detection pro-
grams. Id. at 50, 92– 93, 189– 91. See also TIMOTHY SHIMEALL & JONATHAN SPRING, INTRO-
DUCTION TO INFORMATION SECURITY: A STRATEGIC-BASED APPROACH (2013) (organizing
cyber defense measures around four defensive strategies: deception, frustration, resis-
tance, and recognition and recovery).
122. See generally Jan E. Messerschmidt, Hackback: Permitting Retaliatory Hacking by
Non-State Actors as Proportionate Countermeasures to Transboundary Cyberharm, 52
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 275 (2013); Zach West, Young Fella, If You’re Looking for Trouble
I’ll Accommodate You: Deputizing Private Companies for the Use of Hackback, 63 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 119 (2012).
123. Remarks by Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell at the Georgetown
Cybersecurity Law Institute (May 20, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assis
tant-attorney-general-leslie-r-caldwell-delivers-remarks-georgetown-cybersecurity (dis-
cussing “the use of ostensibly defensive measures, such as ‘hacking back’ into an
attacker’s system either to punish an attacker or to retrieve or delete stolen data,” and
concluding that not only are such measures prohibited under the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act but that “sound policy also militates against use of hackback tactics”).
According to Caldwell, such “sound policy” arguments include the significant risk to
innocent third parties, interference with ongoing government investigations, and detri-
mental effect on U.S. foreign relations, as well as the “low likelihood of being beneficial.”
See generally Yang, supra note 96 (examining the legality of hackbacks under U.S.
domestic law).
124. Jensen, supra note 65, at 1566 n.205. See generally Jay P. Kesan & Carol M.
Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense and Deterrence in Cyberspace, 25 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 429 (2012) (examining tactics such as hackbacks under the law of armed
conflict); Sklerov, supra note 55 (same).
125. See generally JUDITH RODIN, THE RESILIENCE DIVIDEND: MANAGING DISRUPTION,
AVOIDING DISASTER, AND GROWING STRONGER IN AN UNPREDICTABLE WORLD (2014).
126. DOD CYBER STRATEGY, supra note 34, at 11 (“Because the Defense Department’s
capabilities cannot necessarily guarantee that every cyberattack will be denied success-
fully, the Defense Department must invest in resilient and redundant systems so that it
may continue its operations in the face of disruptive or destructive cyberattacks on DoD
networks.”).
127. See Robert Westervelt, Kaspersky: Redundancy, Offline Backup Critical for
Cyberdefense, CRN (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.crn.com/news/security/240148219/kas
persky-redundancy-offline-backup-critical-for-cyberdefense.htm.
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native capabilities to protect against disruptions in the primary systems.128
In a similar vein, the International Law Commission’s (ILC) work on draft
articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters has recently
adopted the idea of disaster risk reduction and seeks to impose on all
states the obligation to reduce the risk of disasters by taking the necessary
and appropriate measures, including through legislation and regulations,
to prevent, mitigate, and prepare for disasters.129  Such disaster risk reduc-
tion measures would include the “conduct of risk assessments, the collec-
tion and dissemination of risk and past loss information, and the
installation and operation of early warning systems.”130  As the ILC
explains, the obligation to reduce the risk of disasters covers not only the
response phase of a disaster, but also the “pre-disaster duties of States.”131
Quoting from the 2005 Hyogo Declaration,132 the ILC’s commentary on
draft article 11 notes that
a culture of disaster prevention and resilience, and associated pre-disaster
strategies, which are sound investments, must be fostered at all levels, rang-
ing from the individual to the international levels . . . . Disaster risks,
hazards and their impacts pose a threat, but appropriate response to this can
and should lead to actions to reduce risks and vulnerabilities in the
future.133
Resiliency134 relates to the ability to adapt and respond rapidly to dis-
ruptions and maintain continuity of operations.135  It requires preparing
for potential threats to the continued functioning of computer networks
and delivery of critical services.136  As Secretary Carter suggested, “[w]e
have to . . . conduct exercises in resiliency . . . so that if a cyberattack
degrades our usual capabilities, we can still mobilize, deploy, and operate
our forces in other domains— air, land, and sea— despite the attack.”137
For its part, redundancy is a critical component in resiliency planning.
128. See Presidential Policy Directive, supra note 5.
129. See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 66th Sess., May 5– June 6, July 7– Aug. 8, 2014,
U.N. Doc. A/69/10, Ch. V [hereinafter ILC Report].
130. Id. at 88.
131. Id. at 111.
132. World Conference on Disaster Reduction, Hyogo Declaration, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.206/6 (Jan. 18– 22, 2005).
133. ILC Report, supra note 129, at 112.  Similarly, the ILC quotes the concluding
summary by the Chair of the fourth session of the Global Platform for Disaster Risk
Reduction (2013) noting the “growing recognition that the prevention and reduction of
disaster risk is a legal obligation, encompassing risks assessments, the establishment of
early warning systems, and the right to access risk information.” Id.
134. Other terms have been used to express similar ideas such as robustness, recon-
stitution, recovery, resourcefulness, adaptability, reliability, and mission assurance. See
generally Nicholas J. Multary & Christopher S. Oehmen, Building the Theory of Resili-
ence, PAC. NW. NAT’L LABORATORY, http://cybersecurity.pnnl.gov/documents/Theory_of_
Resilience-V15.pdf.
135. Hugh Boyes, Resilience and Cyber Security of Technology in the Built Environment,




137. Carter, supra note 13.
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Redundancy is crucial to achieving safety of ICT systems and ensuring that
critical infrastructures that depend on ICT systems continue to function
during a cybersecurity incident, as redundancy mitigates possible attacks
against, or breakdowns of, a single point of failure.138
Implementing defenses and measures as noted above may not be easy.
Existing poor cyber hygiene139 is exacerbated by the fact that new vulnera-
bilities are easily discovered and exploited.140  This is especially true in the
context of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and public domain products,
whose structure is widely available and can be readily analyzed by attack-
ers.141  Continuous monitoring of potential threats is expensive both in
financial terms and in terms of the necessary human resources.  Such con-
tinuous monitoring may be extremely difficult or even impossible to per-
form for many states around the world who lack the financial wherewithal
and the required technological capacities.142
In addition to technological mechanisms to prevent or minimize harm
resulting from cybersecurity incidents, DAS may also be expected to ensure
that the proper legal measures are put in place.  For example, state practice
of treating cyber attacks as criminal offenses under domestic law seems to
reflect recognition of the duty to prevent cyber attacks.143  Improving a
nation’s cyber detection, attribution, and punishment capabilities may, in
turn, “make cyber espionage [and attacks] so costly that [they] no longer
138. See, e.g., Arquilla, supra note 27. See also Shane Harris, Exclusive: Meet the Fed’s
First Line of Defense Against Cyber Attacks, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 29, 2014), http://
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/28/exclusivemeet_the_secret_fed_cyber_se
curity_unit_keeping_trillions_of_dollars_s.
139. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Building a New Command in Cyberspace, STRATEGIC
STUD. Q. 3, 6 (2011), http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2011/summer/summer11.pdf.  Poor
hygiene may result from poor systems administration (for example, failure to install
security and safety updates, failure to maintain proper firewalls and update virus defini-
tions).  See Shackelford, supra note 47, at 982, as well as from the fact that implementa- R
tion of defenses against cybersecurity incidents may get in the way of developing new
systems and responding to user requests. See also Sara Kraemer & Pascale Carayon,
Human Errors and Violations in Computer and Information Security: The Viewpoint of
Network Administrators and Security Specialists, 38 APPLIED ERGONOMICS 143, 143– 44
(2007).
140. Matthew Miller et al., Why Your Intuition About Cyber Warfare Is Probably Wrong,
SMALL WARS J. 4 (2012), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/why-your-intuition-
about-cyber-warfare-is-probably-wrong.
141. YURCIK & DOSS, supra note 47, at 5.  Production of COTS is often rushed to the
market with multiple, existing system vulnerabilities, referred to as “technical debt.”
Shackelford, supra note 47, at 982.  Furthermore, most softwares are tested by the pene- R
trate-and-patch approach, whereby someone finds an exploitable security “hole” and the
software manufacturer issues a patch.  This leaves many vulnerabilities in the software.
YURCIK & DOSS, supra note 47, at 5.
142. For discussion of the links between the legal obligation of due diligence and
states’ capabilities, see, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 78, at 74– 76. See also Oren Gross, The
New Way of War: Is There a Duty to Use Drones?, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1, 62– 68 (2015) (dis-
cussing the possibility of applying differential rules to the law of armed conflict; in other
words, imposing different normative obligations on different states based on each
nation’s capabilities).
143. CARR, supra note 11, at 64.
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pay to execute.”144  If there is a high probability that cyber attackers are
detected, identified, and effectively punished by “sanctions, civil litigation,
or otherwise,” there is far smaller incentive to carry through with an
attack.145  Indeed, the implementation of robust criminal justice penalties
for cyber attacks is supported by the World Economic Forum.146  Yet,
whether existing state practice amounts to a norm of customary interna-
tional law is a matter of some contention,147 especially in light of failure by
many states to enforce the law on the books.148
The duty to warn of an impending disaster is not a new concept,
“[especially after] man-made disasters, such as the Chernobyl meltdown
and the Sandoz spill.”149  Indeed, it has been suggested that the Interna-
tional Court of Justice’s decision in the Corfu Channel Case provides the
basis for a general duty to warn other states of potential or impending
harm.150  In the context of cybersecurity threats, however, such a duty to
warn is further complicated by two factors.  First, DAS may not actually
realize that they have fallen victim to an attack or a cybersecurity inci-
dent151 and may also not be able to recognize threats to their ICT systems
in a timely and meaningful manner.  Second, the scope of the warning that
is due (for example, how much information to disclose) may be problem-
atic insofar as much of the pertinent information may be closely linked to
the DAS’ own national security interests and concerns.152  In either case,
the identity of the source of the cyber attack may well remain unknown.153
B. Responsibility of DAS During Cybersecurity Incidents
When prevention has not been successful and a state faces a cyber-
security incident, it bears the responsibility— both to its own citizens and
to other states, and perhaps even non-state actors— to identify expedi-
tiously and effectively the nature of the security risk, assess the harm, pri-
144. Melanie Teplinsky, Cybersecurity and the Cyberthreat Deterrence Trend, THOMSON
REUTERS/ASPATORE, 2015 WL 4512303 at 4 (June 2015).
145. Id. See also DOD CYBER STRATEGY, supra note 34, at 10– 12 (detailing the need
and the guidelines for a comprehensive cyber deterrence strategy to deter key state and
non-state actors from conducting cyber attacks against U.S. interests).
146. RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 16, at 9 (advocating for an “end-to-end crimi-
nal justice system [giving] law enforcement . . . the capability and resources to investi-
gate cybercrimes and to have an appropriate, comprehensive and agile legal code to
support its investigate and prosecutorial activities”).
147. See id. at 65.
148. See Sklerov, supra note 55, at 9– 10. R
149. Tyra Ruth Saechao, Note, Natural Disasters and the Responsibility to Protect: From
Chaos to Clarity, 32 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 663, 681 (2007).  In both of these examples,
however, neither the Soviet Union nor Switzerland, respectively, faced international legal
consequences for their failure to notify adversely affected neighboring states.  Devereaux
F. McClatchey, Chernobyl and Sandoz One Decade Later: The Evolution of State Responsi-
bility for International Disasters, 1986– 1996, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 659, 664– 65
(1996).
150. Id. See also The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4
(Apr. 9).
151. Buckland, supra note 55. R
152. Id. at 27.
153. Id. at 23– 24.
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oritize plans of action to overcome the danger, manage remedial plans as
they are put into action, mitigate damage that has been caused as a result
of the incident, and engage in short-term recovery.
DAS may face certain limitations, both technological and legal, in
responding to a cybersecurity incident.  Even the best detection and moni-
toring programs are unable to detect all cyber incidents.  Indeed, a DAS
may not even realize that it has been the object of a cybersecurity incident
or, alternatively, may face challenges in differentiating between legitimate
operations, intrusive marketing, hacker mischief, competitor attacks, crimi-
nal activity, and cyber terrorism.154  Assessing the harm and damage
wrought by the security incident in order to prioritize plans of action to
overcome the danger and manage remedial plans, as well as to put in place
measures to mitigate the harm, may be similarly difficult.155
Identifying the source of the security incident may be nearly impossi-
ble in some cases— mostly when the cause of the incident is malicious.156
“Sophisticated attacks by knowledgeable operators, whether private or
state-sponsored, are almost impossible to trace using modern prac-
tices.”157  Ascertaining conclusively the identity of an attacker requires an
intensive, time-consuming investigation and the help of the state of origin
of the cyber attack.158  The difficulties inherent in identifying the source of
a cyber attack and, where relevant, attributing the attack to the appropriate
154. Stephen Hinde, Cyber-terrorism in Context, 22 COMPUTERS & SECURITY 188, 188
(2003).
155. See id. at 192.
156. Messerschmidt, supra note 122, at 285 (“The current packet architecture of the
core TCP/IP protocols does not provide an authentication mechanism for individual
packets, making it nearly impossible to verify a sender’s identity.”).  The inability to
attribute a cyber attack to a particular state has, of course, critical ramifications as far as
the jus ad bellum is concerned, for even if the particular attack could be regarded as
amounting to an armed attack for purposes of article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, if it cannot be attributed satisfactorily, then the victim state may not be able to
exercise its right to self-defense. See, e.g., Michael Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and
the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 892, 928– 29 (1999); Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the
Jus ad Bellum Revisited, 56 VILL. L. REV. 569, 586– 87 (2011).
157. Shackelford, supra note 47, at 981. See also Howard F. Lipson, Tracking and R
Tracing Cyber-Attacks: Technical Challenges and Global Policy Issues, CERT COORDINATION
CTR. 13– 15 (2002), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a408853.pdf (discussing
the inherent weaknesses in the design of the Internet); TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND
ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 252 (William
A. Owens et al. eds., 2009).  The Committee on Offensive Information Warfare notes:
[I]t may be difficult even to know when a cyberattack has begun, who the
attacker is, and what the purpose and effects of the cyberatttack are/were.
Indeed, it may be difficult to identify even the nature of the involved party (e.g.,
a government, a terrorist group, an individual), let alone the name of the coun-
try or the terrorist group or the individual.  Knowing the nature of the party is
an important element in determining the appropriate response.  And, of course,
knowing which country, terrorist group, or individual is in fact responsible is
essential if any specific response involving attack is deemed appropriate. (foot-
note omitted)
Id. See also Brenner, supra note 47 (detailing attribution of attacks and attackers).
158. See Jason Barkham, Information Warfare and International Law on the Use of
Force, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 57, 97– 99 (2001).
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state or non-state actors, emphasize yet again the need for close partner-
ship between governments and the private sector.  As Secretary Carter
noted recently:
We like to deter malicious action before it happens, and we like to be able to
defend against incoming attacks— as well as pinpoint where an attack came
from.  We’ve gotten better at that because of strong partnerships across the
government, and because of private-sector security researchers like FireEye,
Crowdstrike, HP— when they out a group of malicious cyber attackers, we
take notice and share that information.159
The challenges and limitations of dealing with cybersecurity incidents
alone, and the impact that such incidents may have on DAS’ own popula-
tions, other countries, and non-state actors, suggest that any discussion of
legal duties of DAS will be founded on notions of cooperation.160  Such
notions, which focus on conduct rather than on outcome,161 and which
ought to be balanced against sovereign prerogatives of states,162 have
found their way into numerous international treaties.163  Yet, at present
they have not attained the status of customary international legal norms.
Generally, the duty to cooperate “must be understood as encompassing a
great variety of coordinating, technical, scientific and logistical activi-
ties.”164  Thus, for example, in the area of responding to natural disasters,
international agreements have referred to coordinating communications
and information sharing,165 addressing regulatory barriers to entry of for-
eign personnel and relief equipment,166 and extending scientific and tech-
nical expertise.167
The challenges and limitations of dealing with cybersecurity inci-
dents, especially when one considers that an incident may impact a DAS’
own population as well as other countries and non-state actors, suggest
that at a minimum DAS ought to report the incident and share relevant
information with other relevant actors.  Indeed, “coordination of communi-
cation and exchange of information is [sic] essential to effective disaster
response.”168  Thus, some writers propose “cyber incident thresholds”
159. Carter, supra note 13.
160. PIERRE-MARIE DUPUY & JORGE E. VIÑUALES, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
64– 66 (2015).
161. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina (Special Rapporteur on the Protection of Persons in
the Event of Disasters), Fifth Rep. on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters,
22– 24, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/652 (Apr. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Valencia-Ospina V].
162. Compare U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 3, with U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1.
163. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 3; United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea art. 303, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; Convention on the Rights of the Child,
Sept. 2, 1990, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, 13174
T.I.A.S. 1; G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Friendly Relations Declaration, U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/
2625 (Oct. 24, 1970); United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stock-
holm Declaration, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 5– 16, 1972) (emphasizing the
importance of international cooperation).
164. Valencia-Ospina V, supra note 161, at para. 93.
165. Id. at paras. 101– 03.
166. Id. at paras. 106– 13.
167. Id. at paras. 104– 05.
168. Id. at para. 101.
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that, when crossed, mandate reporting.169  It is also worth noting that in
those cases when cyber attacks are involved that would constitute not only
an impermissible use of force, but amount to an armed attack for purposes
of article 51 of the U.N. Charter,170 a DAS who wishes to exercise its right
of self-defense would have to notify the Security Council of the armed
attack.171  President Obama’s Policy Directive on Critical Infrastructure
Security and Resilience recognizes the critical role of information sharing
in preparing for, and responding to, cybersecurity incidents.172  The Direc-
tive, looking only at the domestic scene, emphasizes that “a secure, func-
tioning, and resilient critical infrastructure requires the efficient exchange
of information, including intelligence, between all levels of governments
and critical infrastructure owners and operators.”173  Such information
sharing “must facilitate the timely exchange of threat and vulnerability
information as well as information that allows for the development of a
situational awareness capability during incidents.”174  Information sharing
is no less critical on the international level.
The content and scope of reporting and notification are less clear.
First, it is not entirely clear who may be the recipient of such reports and
notifications— other states, or also non-state actors such as private compa-
nies, international organizations, and even individuals.  Non-state actors
may be affected by the incident and may also be able to supply much
required assistance to overcome the cybersecurity incident and mitigate its
harmful consequences.  Second, the substantive content of the report and
notification are similarly unclear.175  A laconic statement— “we have been
the object of a cybersecurity incident”— neither offers much guidance to
others who may be potentially harmed by the incident, nor directs them
towards meaningful ways to assist the DAS.  On the other hand, cyber-
security incidents may involve significant national security interests of the
DAS, which it will be reluctant to expose publicly.176  The close intercon-
nectedness of the civilian and military cyber infrastructures means inevita-
bly that much information about the incidents may be withheld for
169. See Buckland, supra note 55, at 27.  This, however, would not apply to large R
groups of low-level events that together, have a large impact. Cf. id. at 27.
170. As is the case with definitions of the basic terms, there is no consensus with
respect to the question: “when does a cyber incident rise to the level of an armed attack
for purposes of article 51 of the UN Charter?” See, e.g., ANTONIA CHAYES, BORDERLESS
WARS: CIVIL MILITARY DISORDER AND LEGAL UNCERTAINTY 130– 71 (2015); Antonia Chayes,
Rethinking Warfare: The Ambiguity of Cyber Attacks, 6 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 474
(2015); Priyanka R. Dev, “Use of Force” and “Armed Attacks” Thresholds in Cyber Con-
flict: The Looming Definitional Gaps and the Growing Need for Formal U.N. Response, 50
TEX. INT’L L.J. 381 (2015); Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF.
L. REV. 817 (2012); Nguyen, supra note 48; Roberts, supra note 29. R
171. U.N. Charter art. 51.
172. See Presidential Policy Directive, supra note 5.
173. Id. at 6.
174. Id.
175. See Valencia-Ospina V, supra note 161, at paras. 102– 03.
176. See Buckland, supra note 55, at 27. R
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national security reasons.177  Revealing the very existence of the incident
may also entail significant embarrassment to DAS— who failed to prevent
the threat from materializing.  Information sharing also raises weighty
issues of privacy and concerns for infringement on civil rights and liber-
ties, especially when such information is shared with foreign entities.
Thus, limitations and restrictions on the content, structure, and type of
information shared, as well as the timeliness of such act of sharing, may
undermine the ability to gain and acquire real-time situational awareness.
Another set of thorny questions arises in the context of external inter-
vention in the aftermath of a cybersecurity incident.  While extension of
such concepts as the responsibility to protect to cybersecurity incidents
may seem, at present, unwarranted,178 other bases may be relevant in
examining external interventions in instances of cybersecurity incidents.
States have been helping each other in the wake of natural disasters— earth-
quakes, floods, tsunamis, typhoons, hurricanes, volcanoes, and droughts—
for centuries, yet confusion and lack of coordination define the current
system of natural disaster response.179  Some of the questions that come
up in the context of responding to natural disasters are also relevant to
cybersecurity incidents for the reasons elaborated above.  In the context of
the responsibilities of DAS in particular, the following questions ought to
be addressed: does a DAS have an obligation to seek assistance in order to
deal with such incidents?  Does it have an obligation to accept offers of
assistance and help if, and when, those are made by other states or non-
state actors?180  Should other states— and perhaps even non-state actors—
be entitled, or perhaps, even have a duty to intervene in the DAS, when the
latter is technologically unable or politically unwilling to address the secur-
ity incident and its ramifications in a timely, effective, and comprehensive
manner?181
177. See id.; Jeffrey T.G. Kelsey, Hacking into International Humanitarian Law: The
Principles of Distinction and Neutrality in the Age of Cyber Warfare, 106 MICH. L. REV.
1427, 1432 (2008).
178. See U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, ¶ 10(b),
U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) (limiting the application of R2P ideas to four spe-
cific crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity).
179. See David P. Fidler, Disaster Relief and Governance After the Indian Ocean Tsu-
nami: What Role for International Law?, 6 MELB. J. INT’L L. 458, 459 (2005); Alejandra de
Urioste, When Will Help Be on the Way? The Status of International Disaster Response
Law, 15 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 181, 183– 85, 194 (2006); Saechao, supra note 149, at
665– 66.
180. See also Duncan B. Hollis, An e-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L. J. 374,
408– 25 (2011) (discussing a “duty to assist” network for victims of the most severe
cyber threats).  A concomitant issue, outside the scope of this Article, is if other states
and non-state actors should have the right to intervene even in the absence of DAS’
consent to overcome an incident that may affect their own interests, such as when a DAS
is technologically unable or politically unwilling to address effectively and comprehen-
sively the risk that is presented by the incident.
181. See, e.g., Council Regulation 1257/96,1996 O.J. (L 163) 1 (EU) (stating that,
“people in distress, victims of natural disasters, wars and outbreaks of fighting, or other
comparable exceptional circumstances have a right to international humanitarian assis-
tance where their own authorities prove unable to provide effective relief”) (emphasis
added).
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Instructive parallels may be drawn from the International Law Com-
mission’s work on protecting persons in the event of a disaster.  A signifi-
cant part of its efforts has been directed at establishing the legal duties of
states affected by such disasters.182  The ILC’s draft article 12 of the draft
articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters establishes an
effected state’s duty to ensure both the protection of persons and to ensure
the provision of disaster relief and assistance on its territory.183  Draft arti-
cle 13 deals with a duty of the affected state to seek external assistance and
provides that, “[t]o the extent that a disaster exceeds its national response
capacity, the affected State has the duty to seek assistance from among
other States, the United Nations, other competent intergovernmental orga-
nizations and relevant non-governmental organizations, as appropriate.”184
In the context of natural disasters, a duty to seek assistance may derive
primarily from international human rights law.  In the case of cyber-
security incidents, this duty can also be based on the notion of a duty to
cooperate185 and duty to prevent trans-boundary harm to other states.186
Imposing duties on DAS to seek and accept assistance is, to a certain
degree, in tension with traditional notions of sovereign rights and preroga-
tives.  It is thus not surprising that even in the context of catastrophic natu-
ral disaster, some states are weary of couching obligations in legal terms,
preferring instead to use hortatory formulations such as “should seek
assistance.”187  Indeed, even those who accept as desirable a legal duty on
DAS to seek and accept assistance recognize the ability of affected states to
impose certain conditions on the provision of external assistance.188
One important condition that the ILC raises in the context of natural
disasters and whose significance and challenges are likely to be amplified
182. See generally ILC Report, supra note 129.
183. Id. at 117– 19.
184. Id. at 119– 23.  The duty of the affected state to accept external assistance is
qualified by draft articles 14 and 15 that provide, respectively, that the provision of
external assistance requires the consent of the affected State (which shall not be with-
held arbitrarily), and that the affected state may place conditions on the provision of
external assistance. Id. at 123– 26, 127– 29.
185. DUPUY & VIÑUALES, supra note 160, at 64– 66. See also Int’l Law Comm’n Rep. on
the Work of Its Sixty-Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/65/10, at 327– 30 (2010) (discussing
the duty to cooperate in the context of protecting persons in the event of disasters).
186. See discussion supra notes 75– 89 and the accompanying text. See also Int’l Law R
Comm’n Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 372 (2001);
Eduardo Valencia-Ospina (Special Rapporteur on the Protection of Persons in the Event
of Disasters), Sixth Rep. on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, 5– 25, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/662 (May 3, 2013) (analyzing the principle of prevention in human rights
law and international environmental law); DUPUY & VIÑUALES, supra note 160, at 55– 61
(discussing the principles of “no harm” and prevention in the context of international
environmental law); XUE HANQIN, TRANSBOUNDARY DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2009).
187. See Valencia-Ospina V, supra note 161, at para 28.
188. See id. at paras. 117– 81.  In his report, the Special Rapporteur states that “any
condition imposed by the affected State must be reasonable and must not undermine
the duty to ensure protection of persons on its territory.” Id. at para. 119.  He also
emphasizes that the affected state “has a corresponding duty to facilitate the prompt and
effective delivery of assistance.” Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\48-3\CIN301.txt unknown Seq: 30 15-FEB-16 15:59
510 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 48
in the context of cybersecurity incidents pertains to identifying needs and
quality control.189  In the context of natural disasters the ILC emphasizes
the discretionary power of the affected state to choose the assistance that is
“most appropriate to its specific needs”— taking into consideration the
gravity of the emergency to frame appropriate response policies.190  Yet in
the context of cybersecurity incidents, the principle of needs-based alloca-
tion of assistance is likely to be much harder to implement because the
DAS may not actually know that it has been attacked.  It may also be
extremely difficult— if not downright impossible— to assess the scope of the
dangers, the risks involved, and the likely harms that may entail to the DAS
itself, its citizens, and to other countries and non-state actors.  Similarly,
quality control is likely to pose major challenges when viewed in the con-
text of assistance to overcome cybersecurity incidents and mitigation of
harms that follow from such incidents.
It is worth noting that in its work on protection of persons in the event
of disasters, the ILC has recognized the right of “States, the United Nations,
and other competent intergovernmental organizations . . . to offer assis-
tance to the affected State” responding to a disaster.191  Furthermore, the
ILC’s draft articles provide that “[r]elevant non-governmental organizations
may also offer assistance to the affected State.”192  Concomitantly, the
draft articles provide that, for its part, the affected State “shall take the
necessary measures, within its national law, to facilitate the prompt and
effective provision of external assistance . . . .”193
C. Responsibility of DAS After Cybersecurity Incidents
In the aftermath of a cybersecurity incident, DAS ought to have the
responsibility not only to implement recovery measures194 but also to
engage in long-term adjustment plans and rehabilitation efforts.
One major challenge with cybersecurity incidents is that, “[w]ith the
globalization of communications networks, public safety is increasingly
dependent on effective law enforcement cooperation with foreign govern-
ments.  That cooperation may not be possible, however, if a country does
not have substantive laws in place to prosecute or extradite a perpetra-
tor.”195  International cooperation depends on states enacting relevant
189. Id. at paras. 146– 60.
190. Id. at para. 146 (quoting Int’l Law Comm’n Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third
Session, U.N. Doc. A/66/10, at 249 (2011)).
191. ILC Report, supra note 129, at 129.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 131.
194. G.A. Res. 41/128, annex, Declaration on the Right to Development, art. 1, (Dec.
4, 1986) (“[A]n inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all
peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural
and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be
fully realized.”). See also INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, INT’L
DEV. RESEARCH CTR, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT xi (2001), http://responsibilitytopro
tect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.
195. Miriam F. Miquelon-Weismann, The Convention on Cybercrime: A Harmonized
Implementation of International Penal Law: What Prospects for Procedural Due Process?, 23
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domestic legislation, both penal and civil, and enforcing such legislation.
In a similar vein, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373 states that “all
States shall . . . [a]fford one another the greatest measure of assistance in
connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to
or financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining
evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings.”196
Conclusion
Cybersecurity incidents may result in significant harm regardless of
whether the cause of such harm is a premeditated syntactic or semantic
attack orchestrated by states or hacktivists, or a natural disaster that
results in partial or complete destruction of digital infrastructure or net-
works.  Preventing, overcoming, and recovering from such incidents
require concerted actions by a variety of actors, both state and non-state,
both domestically and internationally.  There is a multiplicity of stakehold-
ers in ICT networks and CIS structures.  Domestically, federal (where rele-
vant), state and local government, civil society, organizations and
corporations, individuals, owners, and operators of critical infrastructure
all have an essential stake in the issues discussed in this Article.197  Inter-
nationally, foreign governments, as well as non-governmental organiza-
tions and international organizations, may be both part of the problem and
of the solution.198  The diversity of stakeholders raises concerns of frag-
mentation, transparency, oversight, accountability, cost, and network com-
plexity.199  At the same time, the growing challenges of cybersecurity
incidents require streamlined processes for collaboration and exchange of
information.  They also require recognition and acknowledgement that
every state, whether a source state for such incident or a state directly
affected by the incident, must bear some responsibility to prevent, mitigate,
manage, and ultimately recover from such incidents.  Such responsibilities
are owed, ultimately, both to the state’s own citizens and to the global com-
munity of states and non-state actors.
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 329, 335– 36 (2005) (citing U.S. Dept. of Just., Com-
ments of the United States Government on the European Commission Communication
on Combating Computer Crime).
196. Christopher E. Lentz, A State’s Duty to Prevent and Respond to Cyberterrorist
Acts, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 799, 820 (2010) (citing S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 2(f) (Sept. 28, 2001))
(emphasis added).
197. A GAO report found that thirty-one out of thirty-four of the United States
Department of Defense’s most critical assets were dependent upon the public power
grid, which is eighty-five percent privately owned and, under current U.S. law, cannot be
ordered to comply with hardening its networks against cyber attacks. U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-147, DEFENSE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE: ACTIONS NEEDED
TO IMPROVE THE IDENTIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT OF ELECTRICAL POWER RISKS AND VUL-
NERABILITIES TO DOD CRITICAL ASSETS 10, 22, 36 (2009).
198. Buckland, supra note 55, at 17. R
199. Id.
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